Abstract: This paper presents several ideas pertaining to desirable properties associated with protocols for moving large amounts of data over a grid of high performance computers. The protocol enhancements are discussed in terms of their scalability and identifying sources of potential protocol redundancy. In the context of this paper it is scalability as it relates to the transport of increasingly larger amounts of data over grid computing networks. Specifically we address efficacy in moving large data sets between nodes on a grid interconnected over a Wide Area Network (WAN) in terms of increasing the basic packet size and better suited to transport protocols. In addition we introduce a means of better evaluating error detection models as functions of increased packet size.
Introduction: moving large datasets across an HPC grid
Computational high performance grids are beginning to take shape addressing specialised computation, access to shared resources and the movement of large amounts of data. These have often been denoted computational, access, and data grids. Our research addresses data grids and the need to more efficiently move large amounts of data between them.
There are a number of other initiatives also oriented towards more efficiently moving large amounts of data across a WAN between HPC resources. For example, some of the motivation for the Web100 initiative came from the following arguments (Web100, 1999 ). Today's internet grids potentially offer gigabit-persecond bandwidth between nodes. While the national high-performance network infrastructure has grown tremendously both in bandwidth and accessibility, it is still common for applications, hosts and users to be unable to take full advantage of this new and improved infrastructure. This is often a result of using legacy protocols such as FTP over TCP. Such network performance problems are mostly caused by poorly designed and poorly implemented host software in Layers 3-7 of the OSI Reference Model. This is often exacerbated by the fact that the network and grid are somewhat independent in terms of ownership and management.
TCP is extensively used and has an impressive track record for reliable communication. However, there has been and clearly still is considerable room for continuously improving transport layer performance. This is evidenced by the continual effort to improve applications such as FTP (e.g., Web100 FTP (Web100, 1999) , TFTP (Sollins, 1992) , GridFTP (GridFTP, 2001) ), and protocol improvements within TCP (e.g., per-destination MTU discovery (Mogul and Deering, 1990) , 'Large Windows' extensions to TCP (Jacobson et al., 1992) , TCP Selective Acknowledgment (Mathis et al., 1996) , End-to-End Performance Initiative (Performance, 2002) .
Our work differs in several aspects in comparison with the initiatives mentioned above. Firstly we present a discussion centering on increasing the physical layer frame size and motivations for doing so as well as provide estimates of what reasonable frame sizes should be. Secondly, we demonstrate our protocol called Phatpackets as a high performance protocol that is inherently rate based and considerably more adaptive and controllable than those based on TCP. The opportunity for development and experimentation is also considerably easier as Phatpackets is an open source initiative with emphasis on developing prototype transfer programs at the application layer. That is, transfer programs can be written and extended emulating functions that would be better suited to eventual deployment at the transport layer without requiring low level operating system modifications. Many of these would not otherwise be possible without root access and protocol stack modifications. The third aspect of the work presented here concerns issues with error control and data integrity associated with moving large data sets utilising conventional error detection.
In effect, we are presenting results that relate to more effectively moving large amounts of data across WANs between high performance compute nodes. The issues that most directly impact these communication considerations are the size of data packets, the transport layer associated with reliable and efficient transfer and potential problems associated with the error control provided at the physical, transport, and application layers of communicating hosts. This paper addresses each of these communication issues within HPC grids.
Transport layer issues
Protocols and parameters associated with protocols are the weakest link in the chain regarding scalable technologies for HPC grids and offer the greatest potential for improvements. In some cases relatively minor protocol improvements have resulted in dramatic performance improvements. These include increasing the IP datagram size from 578 bytes to approximately 1500 thereby providing a better match to the dominant underlying physical layer technology. Other improvements are seen in exploiting multiple connections within applications, again a relatively minor modification involving limited network programming complexity. Improving performance by merely increasing the number of connections actually illustrates inefficiencies in the transport protocol or at the very least poorly configured host parameters. The following discussion starts at the physical layer and migrates towards the application layer.
Increasing the physical layer frame size
The only physical layer and protocol of practical importance in the networking community is ethernet, albeit, wired, wireless, or optical. As such, an argument is presented for increasing the Maximum Transfer Unit (MTU) in terms of its scalability (McLeod et al., 2003) . Here we assume that a more integrated HPC grid will include grid control of the edge devices and strong collaboration with the WAN service provider such that enhanced services and protocol extensions such as jumbo frames can be routinely utilised.
The MTU dictates the maximum payload an ethernet frame can handle. The standard maximum ethernet MTU is approximately 1500 bytes. A simple suggestion would be to increase MTU by a factor, still conservative with respect to gigabit ethernet capabilities, but illustrative of the benefits accrued directly from scaling. We simulated an HPC network scenario using the ns2 network simulator (ns2, 2004) . Figure 1 illustrates efficiencies anticipated through simply increasing the MTU. From Figure 1 one can see FTP using a 15 KB MTU was between eight and nine times more efficient than the 1500 B MTU for a 10 MB download. A larger MTU allows TCP to take advantage of available bandwidth more effectively during slow start or fast recovery. Figure 2 illustrates the same results plotted against variations in the MTU. As clearly illustrated, the performance scales with the increase in MTU in a nearly inverse manner until some apparent optimal setting beyond which larger MTUs considerably and surprisingly reduce performance. This could be a result of TCP's slow start mechanism's doubling of the congestion window after successful transmission. At larger MTUs the channel capacity will be considerebly overshot by congestion window doubling. This results in buffer/queue overflow and/or delays leading to retransmission timeouts and unneccessary retransmissions. This is a well documented phenomenon (Floyd, 2004) . These preliminary results are extremely encouraging within the context of moving large amounts of data between disk arrays across a grid, for which a technology such as iSCSI may be employed. iSCSI coincidentally and fortuitously is oriented to larger frames of data on the order of 8 KB, clearly within the range of maximised performance with increased physical layer MTUs.
Improving the transport layer
TCP was not originally intended for reliable high bandwidth networks. Even though TCP has been considerably modified for modern networks, it is inherently non-optimal for HPC grids. Therefore, consideration should be given to alternative transport layers. As a candidate transport layer, a prototype rate based transport layer denoted Phatpackets is presented and evidence for its scalability presented (Huang, 2004) . It should be noted that in each case the WAN studies were conducted over CAnet 3 which is an over-provisioned network with minimal traffic. That is, the experiments were performed between HPC nodes on a high performance communication backbone, a prototypical environment for an HPC grid. Complete details of these and other trials as well as an open source implementation can be found at www.phatpackets.com. Figure 3 illustrates results comparing TCP based downloads vs. Phatpackets and allows one to estimate the exponent governing the underlying transport. Although not analysed in great detail here, the various combinations of protocols, HPC clients and servers over a WAN scale fairly well albeit with considerable difference in the overhead. The slopes vary from below 1 to slightly greater than 1 but remain surprisingly close to unity. Eventually the slope of all configurations approach 1. The Phatpackets protocol is potentially quite aggressive which may account for its sub linear scaling behaviour. Table 1 illustrates the types of potential improvements seen during transfers from HPC resources across Canada to the University of Manitoba that are possible with relatively simple changes at the application layer. In future we hope to extend these comparisons to moving large amounts of data on WestGrid (WestGrid, 2005) with the networking resources provided within WestGrid. Figure 4 illustrates the effect of the flow control within Phatpackets. As the basic transport is rate based it is inherently easier to control than a window based transport layer and well suited to moving large amounts of data between HPC hosts over a WAN. 
Phatpackets
The current status of HPC resources whether as part of an HPC-WAN initiative or a more traditional HPC is that users are provided accounts. These accounts are typically as users with limited privileges. Therefore, extremely effective peer to peer data sharing applications such as Bittorrent (The BitTorrent P2P file-sharing system, 2005) are unlikely to find their way onto HPC grids anytime soon, as they require root access to install. Peer to peer file sharing applications usually rely on the fact that that many people want a copy of the download which may not be the case for large scientific data sets which may only be of interest to a small group or an individual. Even more reasonable grid based approaches like GridFTP require non-trivial installations of its API/libraries. These require root level installation and OS tuning to effectively leverage its advantages. On the other hand, Phatpackets is well tailored to these current HPC grid constraints. To recapitulate, Phatpackets can be installed by any user who can click a mouse as the current implementation is written in Java. Most HPC resources that we have used, or are aware of, support Java as it is a mainstream programming language. These include resources at the University of Manitoba, numerous resources on WestGrid, and at Memorial University in Canada. Phatpackets does not require any OS tuning on the part of the user. It will attempt to maximise the download efficiency within the confines of its environment, probing and adapting itself to the most optimal rate it can obtain. At the same time Phatpackets is not overly aggressive, allowing it to co-exist with other transport mechanisms. It may, however, require ports to be opened on firewalls. We have also been developing a version that circumvents firewalls without user intervention.
Having a port open on a firewall is not necessarily a security vulnerability as it depends on the daemon or process waiting for or willing to send data. Also, as mentioned, Phatpackets is open source and can be modified by a user for their specific application.
Packet error aliasing
In an HPC grid it would not be uncommon to desire a high performance disk access as if it were local. The last issue addressed in this paper concerns moving large data sets between HPC nodes and is related to typical error detection techniques employed on WANs.
These methods work quite well under the assumption that the error is detected. The problem arises for packets in error that avoid detection. Here these packets or frames are called aliased. For these packets the error checker will indicate that the packet is okay when in reality it is in error. Aliased packets have largely been ignored or never considered although well documented (Stone and Partridge, 2000) . One of the reasons that they perhaps were ignored was that under most circumstances they are pathological as in occurring so seldom that their effect can be safely ignored. Error coverage from a 32 bit maximal length Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) such as that employed in ethernet alone is 1 part in 4.3 billion. This is however an asymptotic limit, which will be discussed later. Aliased packets from a combined application like iSCSI, TCP, and ethernet system on a grid would be considerably less likely. One can, however, argue that at each level where data are manipulated, buffered, or moved there is a possibility of errors occurring manifesting themselves as aliased packets.
Aliased packet probabilities
The basic model for calculating aliased packet probabilities is a simple Markov model derived from the state transition diagram in the presence of a medium with a Bit Error Rate (BER). The Markov model for the 3 bit CRC is shown in Figure 5 . The basic model that will be presented here has been around for approximately 15 years in relation to VLSI signature analysis and the probability of signature registers making similar mistakes (Williams et al., 1988; David, 1990) . Mathematically the Markov model can be cast as a probability transition matrix equation relating the probability of being in any given state at time t to that of being in any state at time t + 1. The probability matrix is doubly stochastic and has the well known property of asymptotically converging to the probability of any state being 1/2n where n would be the number of bits in the CRC. The probability of a packet aliasing through the CRC in error is modelled as the probability of a bit stream in error generating the error free signature. This is the same for all packets and as such the model can use an all zero packet as the error free packet and a packet in error as any packet that contains a non zero bit. This allows one to start the matrix iteration with P0 = 1, with the remaining state probabilities all zero. Iteration of the state transition probability matrix allows one to calculate the probability of being in any given state at time equal to the iteration number.
The probability of aliasing is defined as the conditional probability P(aliasing) = P{P[0] | P(error occurred)}. That is, the probability of error is calculated as the probability of being in the P[0] state given that an error has occurred. 
State transition matrix:
The state transition matrix is sparse and hence relatively efficient techniques can be deployed to calculate the state transition probabilities as data bits enter the CRC register. The algorithm, however, is still O(2 n ) or O(i2 n ) where i is the number of iterations we are interested in. As such exact results presented here are primarily for 16 bit maximal length CRCs. Results of extensive simulation for 32 bit CRCs are presented subsequently. Figure 6 illustrates the probability of a packet aliasing though undetected given the channel has associated with it of a BER ranging from 10 -4 to 10 -8
. These BERs are likely higher than those encountered on reliable grid but may reflect an accumulative error over a number of routers. The interesting aspects of Figure 6 are as follows. For BERs on the order of 10 -4 or 10 -8 the asymptotic limit of P(aliasing) being approximately 1/2 16 is not approached until the CRC has evaluated well over 12,000 bits. At 12,000 bits the probability of aliasing is still approximately five times higher than predicted by the asymptotic limit.
In the figure, all the curves are basically on top of each other. For the 16 bit CRCs analysed here, the probability of minimum size ethernet frames (64 bytes) aliasing is on the order of 0.002% or 0.2% of packets detected in error. For packets on the order of iSCSI data frames (8 KB), the probability of aliasing is very close to that predicted by the asymptotic limit (within 1%). Again control packets such as acknowledgements would be more susceptible to aliasing. Although preliminary, the asymptotic behaviour appears to be present even as the size of the CRC register increases. For a BER of 10 -7 the behaviour of a 20 bit maximal length CRC is almost identical to that of a 16 bit maximal length CRC as illustrated in Figure 7 . 
TCP error control
In addition to CRC aliasing there is also a potential problem when an aliased packet is sent on to the TCP layer where the segment is checksummed. The checksum is basically a simple 16 bit addition which is clearly subject to bit errors which essentially add in a power of two and subsequently subtract it out again. Unfortunately, the Markov model technique used previously cannot be used directly without requiring dense matrix multiplication. A simple rare event simulator was written that indicated that the aliasing probability was approximately 0.0027 (total packets 100001 packets with error 16,743 packets that aliased 45). The error model was a uniform BER stream of approximately 1.5 × 10 -5 with a single bit in word error probability of 8/2
15 . The packet size was 1500 bytes. The simulator was run with various seeds and test packets yielding variations on the results on the order of +/-one packet being aliased.
For example assuming there is a 0.00008 probability of aliasing from the CRC at a BER of 10 -5 , of these 0.0027 (0.27%) of them will pass through the transport layer in error to the application layer, which means with probability 0.00000021 an erroneous packet will make it to the application layer. The expected number of packets seen before an error occurs would be 4,800,000, or a 7GB file. Statistical independence is assumed here between the two detection schemes. In cases where extreme data integrity is required this may be significant albeit noted that these results were obtained with a 16 bit CRC and 16 bit TCP checksum. The TCP checksum cannot be improved upon but it is anticipated that a 32 bit CRC at its asymptotic limit would provide many of orders magnitude greater protection than the result mentioned here. Figure 8 illustrates the probability of TCP checksum aliasing as a function of packet size. The calculation is based on the number of packets aliased over the number in error. The simulation used a constant BER of approximately 1.5 × 10 -5 . 
CRC simulations
An attempt to predict maximal length CRC aliasing has been initiated through simulation. At present we have completed simulating the coverage provided by the 32 bit CRC defined by: x32 + x26 + x23 + x22 + x16 + x12 + x11 + x10 + x8 + x7 + x5 + x4 + x2 + x + 1. Even with a BER on the order of 10 -4 we have not been able to detect an aliased packet as a result of the CRC improperly classifying an erroneous packet. The simulation has exercised 1 billion maximum size packets running for over 280 hours on Polaris, the University of Manitoba's high performance compute node.
iSCSI error control
In an HPC grid scenario it is assumed that an application such as iSCSI may be reasonably expected to become part of a grid's networking resources. The following discussion makes that assumption. As such, adding an iSCSI CRC would also improve aliasing performance considerably. Unfortunately, the CRC aliasing does not account for the discrepancy seen on real networks with real data. Here erroneous packets fairly routinely escape detection as discussed in Stone and Partridge (2000) . A signature attached to the entire file is a potential solution although it may mean retransmitting a very large file once the entire file is checked for integrity. A better solution and one that perhaps should be included in a reliable iSCSI implementation would be one that signatures data on iSCSI boundaries of 64 KB for example using an HMAC (Hash function Message Authentication Code) as well as requiring the iSCSI to be deployed within the IPsec (IP network security) authentication framework at the packet level.
In the case of control packets their aliasing behaviour warrants further consideration. Although not integral to the actual data they can play a role in how well the application and transport layer respond in terms of error and flow control. In certain circumstances the control information may also be of crucial importance.
Experimental results
Two experiments were performed to determine if CRC/TCP aliasing errors could be detected in a manner similar to those of the study by Stone and Partridge (2000) . The networks chosen were a wireless LAN and an ADSL connection from a residential host to the University and back.
The first was a file transfer experiment over a wireless LAN. The experiment consisted of FTP over TCP of a 4 MB file. An MD5 hash (Rivest, 1992) was performed after every transfer to verify that no aliasing had occurred -i.e., an error got through both the CRC and TCP checksum. The network topology was as follows, a receiving station to an ethernet switch at 100 MB, a wireless access point 802.11b (11 Mbps), connected to a wireless host (running windows XP). The 4 MB file was sent 100,082 times without ever failing the MD5 check. In effect approximately 3.2 Terabits of actual data were transmitted without incurring one aliased packet.
A second experiment transferred data of various packet of various size from a residential host to the University and back over an ADSL connection. The trials spanned a total of approximately 12 hours, on different days with 18 hops between the two hosts used. The UDP packets were sent from a residential ADSL host to the UM, where a Linux iptables firewall rule redirected the UDP packets back to the originating IP host, a total of 36 hops. UDP checksums were disabled (set to 0 × 0000) both in the incident and reflected packets, thereby allowing the monitoring of packets in error that escaped physical layer error detection. Although there were several periods of excessive round trip times and packet loss in excess of 20 packets in a row only one instance of packets error escaping CRC detection was observed. Out of the 313,985 packets and approximately 235 MB sent in tests so far, there have been 21 bytes in error which occurred within packets of 67 bytes in size. The source of the errors is still undetermined and not reproducible. This type of intermittent aliasing is perhaps of more concern as it is a source of error that is non-deterministic.
Conclusions
Simulation results as well as arguments were presented to support the transition towards larger MTUs for HPC grids. Our research, although modest, clearly illustrates that throughput improvements can be achieved by increasing the MTU at the ethernet layer and recommends to those promoting computational grids that in addition to compute, storage, and traditional networking resources that HPC grids should attempt to exploit extensions such as larger MTUs at the physical layer between nodes. If TCP is to be used as the HPC transport protocol then special consideration should be taken to ensure that TCP performs well in the HPC environment. There is a strong potential of TCP overshooting the channel capacity as demonstrated in Figure 2 when deployed in a high capacity network. Therefore even for TCP not utilising an increased MTU consideration should be given to recommendations made in RFC 3742: Limited Slow-Start for TCP with Large Congestion Windows (Floyd, 2004) .
Improvements can be achieved at the transport layer for grid applications that require timely transport of large data sets by migrating towards rate based transport layer protocols. That is not to say that ongoing efforts in improving TCP as a mainstream protocol are not invaluable. It is just our contention that eventually even these will be replaced by more easily controlled and more predictable rate based transport protocols. Again ours is a modest albeit effective demonstration of how efficient rate based transport can be. Based on experiences garnered to date it is clear that an efficient transport layer should be rate based incorporating both positive as well as negative acknowledgements. The negative acknowledgements are basically used for retransmitting lost packets while the positive acknowledgements would allow for tight closed loop control associated with adapting the transmission rate.
The paper also introduced a Markov analysis to model aliased packets that escape CRC or TCP error detection. The analysis, however, does not seem to account for the anomalously high degree of aliased packets seen in real traffic studies. Not withstanding, as CRC and TCP aliasing errors are present, a model should be developed to account for aliasing independent of its origin as these aliased packets do in fact influence network performance and potentially data integrity. If a person is designing or using a system and a CRC is used, then it should be used in consideration of its possible limitations as opposed to its asymptotic behaviour. This is especially so if the size of the packets is minimal and the integrity of those packets is important. Based on mounting empirical evidence all systems that move large amounts of data such as grids should consider aliasing as inherent weather caused by the mathematics or not, at least in cases where data integrity is important.
